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In developing countries, per capita demand for livestock products tends to 
increase with economic development.  To ensure that supply meets rising consumer 
demand, policy makers must formulate policies either to increase domestic livestock 
production or to rely more on imports.  If neither an increasing reliance on imports nor 
the use of a high domestic price to assure supply and demand balance is a desired policy 
option, policies makers have to seek other means to increase total livestock supply. The 
increased livestock supply generally comes from one of two sources: either by 
encouraging increased production from traditional backyard production or by fostering 
large commercial livestock enterprises.  
Policies to encourage growth in backyard livestock production are different from 
those that would facilitate the expansion of large-scale commercialization.  If decision 
makers only consider policies to foster commercialized operations when they project the 
shortage in the livestock supply, they may waste valuable fiscal resources and policy 
effort.  Such policies could also lead to inefficient investment by private individuals.  For 
example, during the 1980s in China, concerns that livestock production would not be 
sufficient to feed its citizens led to a series of government-initiated programs, most of 
which sought to encourage the establishment of large commercialized livestock 
operations in suburban regions of large cities (Pan, 2000).  The government subsidized 
many of these commercial enterprises.  By the late 1990s, however, many of the 
operations went bankrupt.  During the same time period, with little encouragement from 
policy makers, livestock supplies from backyard operations expanded dramatically to the  
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point that competition from backyard operations may well have driven some of the 
commercialized operations out of business.   
Thus, to make better policy decisions, it is important for policy makers to 
understand the pattern of backyard livestock production and the fundamental economic 
factors that contribute to the observed pattern in backyard hog production during different 
phases of economic development.  In fact, many different economic factors may have 
provided backyard producers with a competitive edge and facilitated their expansion at a 
certain stage of economic development.  The economic literature has suggested that risk 
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Kurosaki, 1998), off-farm wage rates (Benjamin, 1992; 
Skoufias, 1994), and family structure may affect household production behavior.  No one, 
however, has linked the emergence of markets with the pattern of livestock production, 
despite the fact that the emergence of markets was one of the main features that 
characterized economic transition in China during the time that its livestock sector 
underwent dramatic changes. 
In examining the case of China, the absence of well-functioning markets may be 
one factor behind the dynamics in Chinese hog production. The economic literature 
shows that agricultural input, output, and labor markets were poorly developed in China, 
especially at the beginning era of economic reform in the 1980s (Parish, Zhe, and Li, 
1995; Park, Jin, Rozelle, and Huang, 2002; Rozelle, Taylor, and De Brauw, 1999). 
Markets remain underdeveloped in some poor areas and inland regions as of today.  
Institutional barriers have affected labor markets, preventing farm families from moving 
to locations that promise them higher returns (Nyberg and Rozelle, 1999).  Poor grain and 
feed markets can force farm households to rely heavily on their own grain production in  
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their livestock operations.  The imperfections in grain markets can be caused by local 
geographic and transportation conditions or by government grain policies.  Zhang (1999) 
shows that farm households in poorer regions relied as much as 90 percent on their own 
farm’s grain for their livestock operations.  Swings in China’s grain procurement policies 
in the past two decades probably disrupted the development of grain markets (Park, Jin, 
Rozelle and Huang, 2002).   
Over the last two decades, however, markets have emerged.  In the 1980s, farm 
households purchased less than 20 percent of their inputs in the free markets.  By the 
middle 1990s, more than half of the factors of production were purchased through 
markets (Chen and Rozelle, 1999).  While markets have generally improved in all regions 
in China, market development is still uneven across regions.  For instance, the share of 
goods allocated by free markets and the percentage of farm labor working off-farm is 
significantly lower in the poor, inland regions than in the rich, coastal regions.  
While policy makers correctly predicted that backyard hog production would fall 
in the rich, coastal regions, they might not have fully understood the relationships 
between market development and backyard hog production in poor areas.  The increases 
in backyard hog production from less wealthy, inland provinces clearly surprised 
officials.  Furthermore, the increased supply in the inland provinces in conjunction with 
better livestock markets in the 1990s appears to have made the commercial hog sector in 
the coastal areas less competitive.
1 
                                                 
1 Generally, the livestock markets in China might operate more efficiently than the grain markets.  If we use 
the commercialization rate as a measure of the level of market development, data from a comprehensive 
farm household survey conducted by Research Center for Rural Economy (to be discussed in detail later in 
the paper) shows that on average more than 80 percent of hogs produced by farm households were sold in 
the market; while only 25 percent of grain was sold in the market.  This might be partly due to the fact that 
there was more government intervention in the grain sector than in the livestock sector over the past two 
decades.  
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In this paper, I directly investigate the effects of market development on farm 
household hog production.  I find that that grain and labor markets development can 
explain a significant portion of the observed expansions of hog production in poor, inland 
areas and contractions in rich, coastal areas during the past two decades in China.  For 
poor households in the inland areas, it is generally difficult to find off-farm employment 
(especially at the early stage of the economic reform in the 1980s), and thus the 
opportunity cost of labor is low; when facing the right conditions, they are willing to use 
their labor to produce hogs.  However, when areas are at their poorest, their hog 
production is often constrained by the limited available grain and feed supply.  When 
development begins, the emergence of grain and feed markets facilitate household access 
to less expansive feed grain from the market and allows them to utilize their low cost 
labor in hog production to earn additional income.  
For relatively richer households in the coastal areas, I find that the effects of labor 
market development dominate the decision making process.  Better labor markets 
increase the opportunity cost of labor and encourage farm households to send more 
family labor to off-farm labor markets and use less in hog production.  In the meantime, 
improvements in grain markets encourage hog production of commercial operations, 
however this expansions occurs only for a few specialized households.  For most 
households in the coastal areas, their production of hog falls. 
To further examine the dynamics of China’s hog production and understand the 
implications for the implementation of more effective policies, the rest of this paper is 
organized as follows.  In Section 2, I document the ways in which trends in market 
development appear to correspond with observed trends in household hog production.   
  5
This suggests that the level of market development might be a key factor contributing to 
the observed relationship between household hog production and income in China.  I also 
discuss the data set used for the paper.  In Section 3, I provide a theoretical explanation of 
the linkage between markets and household hog production.  I construct a farm household 
model to demonstrate theoretically that labor and grain market development, in 
conjunction with changes in other economic factors, could contribute to the formation of 
the observed relationship between livestock and income.  In Section 4, I econometrically 
estimate the effects of labor and grain market development on household hog production.  
The results indicate that grain and labor market development can explain a significant 
portion of the rise and fall in China’s backyard hog sector over the past two decades.  
Section 5 summarizes findings, draws policy implications and suggests directions for 
future research.  
2. Market Development and Livestock Production 
2.1. The Inverted-U in Household Livestock Production 
Economic studies indicate that the relationship between backyard livestock 
production and the level of economic development might not be monotonic.  Instead, 
backyard livestock production may follow a nonlinear relationship as the economy 
develops.  In the early stages of development, poor farm households tend to expand their 
livestock production when their income increases.
2  However, after their income levels 
                                                 
2 For instance, richer farm households in Pakistan raised more livestock than poorer households (Adam and 
He, 1995). As economies developed in the 1980s and 1990s, poor countries in Southeast Asia, such as 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, and Vietnam, increased their livestock production, and 
most of this increase came from small farms expanding production (FAO, 1999).    
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reach a certain level in the later stages of economic development, livestock production for 
many farm households appears to fall.
3  
Although the data sources I have assembled are quite different in their 
geographical and temporal coverage and level of aggregation, they all illustrate the non-
linear relationship.  Data from Mexico, South Africa, and Taiwan all show an inverted-U 
relationship between backyard livestock production and the stage of development 
(Appendix A).  In each case, I observe that the path of backyard livestock production 
initially expands and then contracts as household incomes improve.  Comparisons across 
countries also indicate that the farm households that produce the most backyard livestock 
have higher than average income, but they are not the richest households.  In other words, 
in all of the sample nations, farm households expand their herd sizes until they are 
somewhat above the median income level.  After that point, households begin to give up 
raising livestock in their backyards.   
To examine the relationship between backyard hog production and income in 
China, I use a data set collected by the survey department of the Rural Center for Rural 
Economy, a research unit affiliated with China’s Ministry of Agriculture (hereinafter 
referred to as the RCRE data).  In the RCRE survey, each sample household is required to 
record all daily activities in the form of a “diary.”  The information is aggregated and 
available on an annual basis, covering a range of subject areas including labor allocation, 
agricultural production and marketing, income from on-farm activities and off-farm 
employment, land use, asset ownership, savings and access to credit.  In addition to the 
household survey, village accountants are also responsible for collecting a community-
                                                 
3 For example, the number of hog producers in Korea in 1999 was only 3 percent of the 1970 level (Korea 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Resource, 2000).  
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level data set.  The community data set includes information on variables that cover total 
village agricultural output and sales, allocation of land and employment of labor in local 
enterprises.  With access to a portion of the RCRE data, my sample includes 670 
households in 29 villages from nine different provinces for all survey years from 1986 to 
1999.  The main data to be analyzed, hog production, come from the section of the RCRE 
data set that reports major outputs of farm products in both value and quantity terms.
4  
Nonparametric analysis, based on a Lowess estimator, demonstrates that, similar 
to other nations, there is also an inverted-U relationship between income and livestock 
production in China (Figure 1).  Low-income farm households produce the fewest hogs 
per household.  When per capita income improves, they tend to increase hog production 
until income reaches approximately 850 yuan, a level somewhat above the median.  A 
further increase in per capita income, however, is associated with a decrease in household 
hog production.
5   
2.2. Household Hog Production and Market Development 
The RCRE data illustrate that market development, especially in the case of grain 
and labor markets, is one of most important features that characterize rural economic 
development in the past two decades in China.  Like Sadoulet, de Janvry and Benjamin 
(1996) and Giles (2000), I use the percentage of the village labor force working in 
nonagricultural sectors as an indicator of labor market development.  Similarly, the 
percentage of grain sold in the market (or the grain commercialization rate) is used as an 
                                                 
4 In the RCRE data, hog output is reported in kilograms rather than in animal units. 
5 Chen (2003) showed that this relationship appears whether I use parametric or nonparametric methods, 
whether I use Lowess estimator or Kernel estimator. Also, it appears in each sample province and each 
sample year.  
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indicator of grain market development.
6  I assume that a better labor or grain market is 
represented by a higher percentage of the village labor force working in off-farm sectors 
or a higher grain commercialization rate.
  
To demonstrate that farm households in different stages of economic development 
face markets of different levels of development, I divide the sample into income terciles 
(low, median, and high income subgroups).  My assumption is that farm households in 
the low-income subgroup represent those at early stages of economic development, while 
the high-income group reflects those at relatively advanced stages of development.  
Examining the data in this way, I can show that labor and grain markets are better 
developed for the higher-income subgroups than lower ones (Table 2).  The share of 
nonagricultural labor accounts for 40 percent of the village labor force in high-income 
groups while it is only 26 percent for the low-income groups.  The grain 
commercialization rates also are higher for the high-income subgroups.  In addition, farm 
households in the medium- and high-income subgroups are more likely to be from plains 
areas (rather than hilly or mountainous areas) and have access to better transportation 
infrastructure (Table 1, columns 6 and 7).  In other words, in richer areas farm 
households might have better grain markets because they face lower transportation and 
other transaction costs when marketing grain. 
                                                 
6 Ideally, the total grain transactions in the market, including both grain purchasing and selling activities, 
would give more precise information on the level of grain market development. Unfortunately, the RCRE 
village surveys did not contain information on grain purchases.  For villages that were mainly grain buyers 
in the market, using the percentage of grain sold in the market might underestimate the level of market 
development because a better grain market would not cause the these villages to sell more grain.  However, 
the RCRE data show that, even for those poorer villages, the grain commercialization rate did increase over 
time. This indicates that this measurement, though imperfect, can still capture the general trend of grain 
market development. In the later empirical analysis, I also use a group of variables that have tight linkage 
to grain transaction costs to measure the grain market development. The merits and weakness of both 
indicators are discussed in more detail in the later empirical part of this paper.  
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A similar pattern linking markets and hog production is found over time.  I find 
that labor and grain markets improve gradually over the survey period for all three 
income subgroups (Table 1, rows 4 to 15 and rows 1 to 3).  For labor markets, the share 
of non-agricultural labor in the village labor force increased by about 10 percent from 
1986 to 1999 for all income subgroups.  For grain markets, taking the low-income 
subgroup as an example, the rate has more than doubled from 14 percent in 1986 to 30 
percent in 1998 (Table 1, column 5, rows 4 to 7).    
The shifts in markets also are correlated with those of hog production.  Using a 
Lowess estimator, the nonparametric analysis traces out the inverted-U shape relationship 
between hog production and grain and labor market development (Figure 2).  I find that 
when grain markets are poor, farm households produce few hogs. As grain markets 
develop, household hog production begins to increase.  Household hog production 
continues to increase until the grain commercialization rate reaches a level of about 20 
percent (or when the share of non-agricultural labor in the village labor force increases to 
35 percent).  Further improvements in grain or labor markets, however, are associated 
with decreases in hog production.  
The changing relationship between grain and labor market development and hog 
production over the course economic development might be a result of the complex 
interactions among many economic factors, including grain and labor market 
development, the farm household’s own-grain production capability and other economic 
factors.  For example, households living in relatively poor, inland areas often confront 
poor grain markets and at the same time these households are often constrained in their 
household hog production decision by the lack of access to sufficient grain and feed  
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supplies.  Using the criterion of whether a household needs to purchase grain to meet its 
own food consumption needs, I find that more than 62 percent of the RCRE households 
in the low-income tercile are grain deficit.  In contrast, only 39 percent of medium-
income households and 31 percent of high income households are grain deficit.
7  Thus, it 
is possible that a grain market development might help these households overcome the 
grain and feed supply constraints and allow hog production to expand.  In the meantime, 
for poor households the initial positive relationship between hog production and labor 
market development could be due to the fact that that as labor markets emerge, they could 
help farm households overcome credit constraints. 
At the more advanced stage of economic development, however, after grain and 
labor markets develop to certain levels, additional market development may have the 
opposite effect.  It is likely that the effects of labor market development might eventually 
dominate.  The increasing opportunity cost of farm labor may encourage farm households 
to send more family labor to the off-farm labor markets and use less in hog production, 
causing the fall in hog output.  While a few households may take advantage of better 
grain markets to purchase grain and feed from markets to specialize in hog production, 
most households would sell their grain in the market and contract their hog production 
because of simultaneous changes occurred in other economic factors.  
In summary, the descriptive analysis suggests that there is a linkage between 
market development and household hog production.  However, the analysis so far is 
                                                 
7 It is very likely that the percentage of households in the low-income tercile being grain deficit might be 
even higher than the above percentage, because some of poor households cannot purchase grain simply due 
to reasons like credit constraints, even if they want to.   On contrary, the actual percentage of farm 
households in the high-income tercile being grain deficit might be lower, because their decisions to 
purchase grain from the market might not be necessarily related to the grain adequacy, but to additional 
choices of food varieties.      
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mostly descriptive in nature and is mostly based on simple correlations without fully 
considering the complexity of the farm household economy.  In the following sections, I 
explain the linkages between market development and household hog production, and 
develop a series of testable hypotheses and use our data to test how market development 
affects hog production. 
 
3. Households Models with Imperfect Grain and Labor Markets 
In this section, I start by discussing the representation of market development in 
the farm household model.  I stress the importance of having a model that can explicitly 
represent the emergence of labor and grain markets as gradual processes (rather than ones 
that are only able to examine two extreme market conditions: perfect markets and 
missing markets).  Next, I construct a household-level computable general equilibrium 
model (CGE).  To illustrate that market development might have different effects on hog 
production for farm households with different levels of income, I construct two baselines: 
one that examines a poor farm household and the other a relatively rich household. With 
the model, I first simulate how grain and labor market development encourage the 
expansion of hog production directly.  I also show that grain and labor market 
development, in conjunction with changes in other economic factors, can also encourage 
wealthier farmers to reduce their hog production and create the inverted-U relationship 
between income and hog production.  The last subsection concludes with a list of 




3.1. Transaction Costs and Market Development 
In developing a model of a farm household economy, I choose to use the level of 
transaction costs to represent the different levels of market development, an approach that 
is consistent with the one taken by de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991). 
Transaction costs typically consist of the costs of accessing markets, mark-ups by traders, 
the costs of imperfect information, such as those expenses incurred during the search for 
the best prices and costs of negotiation and bargaining.  De Janvry, Fafchamps, and 
Sadoulet (1991) demonstrate that transaction costs result in a price wedge between the 
household’s buying and selling price.  They suggest that great distances to the marketing 
venues, poor infrastructure, less competitive marketing systems and poor information 
could lead to a large gap between buying and selling prices.
8  When there are no 
transaction costs, the farm household is assumed to operate in perfect markets. In 
contrast, when transaction costs are insurmountable, farm households are essentially 
operating in an “autarky” situation.
9   
While the case of imperfect markets may be most prevalent in the context of farm 
household economies, studies on market development typically tend to assume the 
existence of either perfect markets or completely missing markets (e.g., de Janvry, 
                                                 
8 For example, using data collected in a national survey of Ejido sector conducted in 1994 by the Mexican 
Ministry of Agrarian Reform, Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (1999) reported that the average selling price 
for corn was about 75 percent of the average buying price in 1994.  Ejido land represents about one-half of 
all arable land in Mexico. 
9 According de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, a market fails when a transaction through market 
exchange creates disutility greater than the utility gain that it produces. They suggested to use different 
levels of transactions costs to measure the levels of market development. Empirically, we can use the 
development of infrastructure as an indicator of market development. However, as discussed above, 
transactions costs can be associated with many other thing, such as the competitiveness of a market. These 
costs cannot be captured completely by infrastructure variables.  On the other hand, as suggested by de 
Janvry et al, and also shown in the later part of this paper, transactions costs have a direct bearing to the 
level of market transactions. Higher transactions costs restrict the level of market transactions, while better 
markets stimulate them. Therefore, empirically, we also use grain commercialization rates to proxy for the 
level of grain market development.   
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Fafchamps, and Sadoulet, 1991).  When one looks only at the two extreme cases, it is 
impossible to trace out a continuous relationship between agricultural production and 
market development.  Specific to the study of backyard hog production in China, the 
approach of focusing on the two extreme cases may not be able to trace out the complete 
pattern in hog production--especially when we have good reasons to suspect that the 
relationship between output and grain and labor market development is nonlinear. 
To provide a more complete picture of the relationship between hog production 
and market development, I construct a farm household CGE model that explicitly 
incorporates the different levels of market development as a continuous variable.  To do 
so, I use different levels of transaction costs to represent the different levels of market 
development, ranging very high (which mimics the missing markets case) to very low 
and near zero (the perfect markets case).  In my analytical approach, the farm household 
economy is modeled as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP), where the farm 
household only sells (buys) grain and labor when the shadow prices of grain and labor are 
equal to prices it would receive (pay) in the market.  If the shadow prices are between 
selling and buying prices, or within the price bands created by transactions costs, no 
market transactions occur.  For example, if the buying and selling prices for grain are 1.2 
and 0.8 yuan per kg respectively, the farm households would buy grain only when its 
shadow price of grain is equal to 1.2 yuan per kg and sell grain only if the shadow price 
of grain is equal to 0.8 yuan per kg.
10  However, when the shadow price is between 1.2 
yuan and 0.8 yuan, the farm household would neither purchase nor sell grain in the 
                                                 
10 Please note that the household’s grain shadow price would never be greater than 1.2 yuan per kg, because 
the household can continue to purchase grain from market until the shadow price equals 1.2 yuan per kg. 
Similarly, the shadow price would never be lower than 0.8 yuan per kg. If the household values grain less  
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market.  More detailed discussion on the formulation of MCP is given in the later part of 
the section.
11 
3.2. Farm Household Simulation Model 
I assume that a typical farm household attempts to maximize its utility from 
consuming grain (Xg), commodities purchased from markets (Xm), and leisure (Xl): 
) , , ( l m g X X X U       ( 1 )    
subject to an income and a set of complementarity constraints. The household budget 
constraint can be written as:  
0
) ( ] ) , ( [ ) , , (
≥ − +
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X p E
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     (2) 
where pp and pm are the prices of the market-purchased commodities and hogs, and  ipg 
and ipl are shadow prices of grain and labor that are different from their market prices, 
because grain and labor markets are assumed to be affected by some levels of  
transactions cost.  The shadow prices of grain and labor also have to satisfy additional 
conditions (as is specified in Equation 3 and will be discussed in detail later).  The 
variables, Qg and Qp, are the household’s grain and hog outputs, respectively; Cg is the 
amount of grain crop used to feed hogs; Qg – Xg – Cg is the grain marketed surplus.  
When marketed surplus is positive (negative), the farm household is a net seller (buyer) 
                                                                                                                                                 
than the selling price, it would continue to sell. In equilibrium, the shadow price would be equal to the 
selling price.  
11 I choose not to include risk in the farm household model, mainly because of the complexity of the farm 
household model itself.  Inclusion of a risk factor would make the model so complex that it would not 
converge.  Omitting the risk factor is also supported by the fact that risk might not be the dominating factor 
in the hog production decision-making process in China.  For example, using the same RCRE data, Giles 
(1999) examined how various components of household income contribute to farm household income risks. 
The study found that volatilities in grain prices have minimal effects on income variations in China.  Thus, 
the effect of using hog production to diversify grain price risk is negligible.  Furthermore, Park (1999) 
found that farmers most frequently rely on informal credit, not livestock accumulation, to smooth 
consumption.  The risk factor, however, will be explicitly included in the later econometric analysis.  
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of grain.  The variable, T, is the total stock of household time; Lg and Lp are labor inputs 
in grain and hog production.  T – Xl  – Lg  – Lp is the household’s net labor supply to the 
market, and when it is positive, the household is a net supply of labor; E is the initial 
endowment of income.  Finally, M and A are the fixed assets used in hog and grain 
production.  In sum, this constraint requires the farm household to maintain a balanced 
full-income budget.  
In addition, I specify a set of complementarity conditions that have to be satisfied. 
These are needed since from the perspective of a farm household, when grain markets are 
imperfect, the shadow price of grain is always bounded by its purchasing price and 
selling price. In other words, if the shadow price of grain is less than its purchasing price, 
the household would not purchase any grain from market. Similarly, if the grain shadow 
price is higher than its sale price, it would not sell in the markets. The following 
conditions define this relationship between shadow prices and market transactions  
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Using grain as an example, we can see the role of these constraints in hog production in 
an environment that is characterized by imperfect markets.  In formulating a mixed 
complementary problem, the household’s perceived grain price (ipg) has to be bounded 
by its selling price (p
s
g) and purchase price (p
b
g) as shown in equation 3a.  The household 
only sells grain (Q
s
g>0), when its perceived grain price (ipg) is equal to p
s
i (Equation 3b), 
which is the grain market price (p
m) less the grain transaction costs (T--Equation 3c).  In  
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other words, if the household values grain at an amount no more than what it can earn 
from selling the grain in the market (the difference between the market price and 
transaction cost), it would sell grain into the market and it would receive a price equal to 
p
s
i, which is equal to p
m−T.  Similarly, if the household values grain at an amount more 




m + T.  However, when ipg is between the price band of p
m − T and p
m + T, the 
household would neither purchase nor sell, and it would remain self-sufficient.   
Because Equation 3 introduces a discontinuity in the optimization problem, the 
usual maximization procedures that derive closed-form analytical solutions based on the 
first-order conditions cannot be solved for.  Thus, in this application, I use the PATH 
procedure in the GAMS package to solve the MCP problem.  PATH has been used by 
many to solve MCP problems in economic applications (Rutherford, 1995; Arndt, 
Schiller, and Tarp, 2001; Komen and Peerlings, 2001).
12  
In formulating this simulation model, I use two Cobb-Douglas functions to 
represent the farm household production and consumption behavior.  The key parameters 
for the model are reported in Appendix B.
13  In situations where I do not have sufficient 
information to estimate parameters directly, I use the parameters from literature, such as 
those used in de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991).  
                                                 
12 Typically, Newton’s method has been used in practice to solve the square systems of nonlinear equations. 
The basic idea is to construct a local approximation of the nonlinear equations around a given point, xk, 
solve the approximation of the nonlinear equation around a given point, xk+1=xN, and repeat until a 
solution to the nonlinear system is found. A linear search between xk and xN is also used to reinforce a 
sufficient decrease on an appropriately defined merit function (Ferris and Munson, 2000). The Core 
algorithm is a nonsmooth Newton method to find a zero of the normal map F[π(x)]+x−π(x) associated with 
the MCP. Here π(x) represents the projection of x onto [l,u] in the Euclidean norm.  If x is a zero of the 
normal map, then π(x) solves the MCP (Ferris and Munson, 1998).  Refer to paper for detail. PATH uses a 
generalization of this method on a non-smooth reformulation of the complementarity problem. 
13 For example, I assume that a 1-percent increase in feed usage in hog production would increase hog 
production by 0.35 percent.  
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3.3. Simulation Results 
Direct Effects of Market Development 
  To examine how grain market development might have different effects on hog 
production decisions for households at the different stages of economic development (or 
different income), I have two benchmark scenarios: one representing a poor farm 
household operating in the early stages of economic development with limited grain 
production capability, little access labor market (or facing high transactions costs in the 
labor market); and the other representing a relatively rich household that possesses higher 
yielding grain production technology and has better access to labor market.  We assume 
that when richer farmers are in the labor market, they face no significant transactions 
costs).
14 
Simulation results confirm that the development of grain markets has different 
effects on household hog production for the poor and rich farm households.  When grain 
transaction costs decrease at a rate of 5 percent of its market price per period, from 55 
percent of market price (Period 1) to zero at Period 12, the simulation results demonstrate 
that the fall in grain transactions costs reduces the shadow price of grain.
15  For the case 
of poor households, the shadow price becomes the same as the price in which it is able to 
purchase grain because the poor household is a net grain purchaser.  Decreases in the 
shadow price of grain in turn lead to the expansion of the use of grain in hog production.  
Simulation results also show that hog output increases continuously from about 140 kg in 
                                                 
14 For instance, the poor household is calibrated as the one that, under perfect market conditions (without 
any transaction costs in grain and labor transactions), would annually purchase 587.5 kg of grain from the 
market, with 500 kg used for human consumption (in addition to its own grain production of 1,000 kg) and 
87.5 kg used for feed grain. In equilibrium, the farm household produces 100 kg of hogs per year and sells 
938 of its 3,200 man-hours of labor in the off-farm labor market.  
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Period 1 to 280 kg in Period 12 (dotted line, Panel A, Figure 3).  In the case of rich 
households, however, the same grain market development increases the selling price of 
grain, resulting in increases in the sale of grain directly onto markets and decreases hog 
production from about 230 kg in Period 1 to 100 kg in Period 12 (solid line, Panel A, 
Figure 3).
16 
In the meantime, decreases in labor transactions costs show a negative effect on 
hog production for both poor and rich households.  For both rich and poor households, 
when transactions costs in labor markets decrease, the shadow price of labor increases.  
For the poor household, when the transactions costs of entering the labor market decrease 
to 35 percent of its market wage rate, the farm household starts to sell more labor in the 
market and use less labor in hog production.  The fall in transaction costs in the labor 
market triggered a reduction in hog production, from about 150 kg in Period 1 to less 
than 50 kg in Period 12 (dotted line, Panel B, Figure 3).  Similarly, in the case of the rich 
farm household, a better labor market also would encourage the household to allocate 
more of its labor in to the off-farm labor market and use less in hog production, resulting 




                                                                                                                                                 
15 I found that if grain (or labor) transactions costs reach 50 percent of their market prices, no market 
transaction would occur.    For the purpose of simulation, I use these high transactions costs to emulate the 
condition of missing markets.  In reality, transactions costs could be lower. 
16  The simulation can further show that if transactions costs in labor market remain high, the poor farm 
household might continue to expand hog production by purchasing additional feed from market following a 
grain market development, irrespective of its overall grain balance situation.  
17 The simulation results can also show that for the rich household, the effects of labor market development 
on hog production hinge upon the relative profitability between labor income and hog income.  If hog 
production is more profitable, especially for those specialized hog producers with better production 
technologies, the simulation can show that a better labor market might induce an increase in labor hiring, 
and spur the specialization in hog production.   
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Indirect Effects of Market Development 
Grain and labor market development also affects hog production indirectly. 
Economic development is often accompanied by a series of changes in other economic 
factors, including rising wage rates, continuous improvements in grain production 
technologies, increasing investment in hog production, and contraction in family size.
18  I 
investigate the impact of these factors on household hog production under the scenarios 
of perfect markets (i.e., no TCs), missing grain markets (very high TCs), missing labor 
markets, and both missing grain and labor markets (Table 2).  The analysis suggests that 
the presence of imperfect markets makes household grain yields and family size relevant 
factors in hog production. For example, grain yield improvement has no impact on hog 
production under the perfect grain markets scenario.  However, it has a significant and 
positive effect on hog production when grain markets are missing.  Without grain 
markets, the only way a farmer can increase the amount of feed that can help him expand 
hog production is to grow it himself.  Similarly, family labor endowment would have no 
effect when labor markets are perfect.  When labor markets are missing, however, a 
contraction in household labor size could have a significantly negative effect on hog 
production.  
Overall Effects of Market Development 
The simulation exercise up to now only investigates how a change in a single 
economic factor would affect hog production, holding all other factors equal.  Economic 
development, however, is more likely to be associated with simultaneous changes in 
many economic factors.  To show this, we examine how hog output would change 
                                                 
18 Based on the RCRE data, Appendix C summarizes how these economic factors change over the low-, 
medium-, and high-income subgroups.  
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following a simultaneous change in the following factors: a.) grain and labor transaction 
costs decrease at a rate of 0.05 yuan per period;
19 b.) grain yield increases at 2 percent per 
period;
20 c.) other capital inputs used in hog production increases by 10 percent per 
period;
21 d.) wage rate increases by 5 percent per period; and e.) the family labor 
endowment of the household decreases by 2 percent from its initial labor endowment 
(Figure 4).   
Under the multi-dimensional, “economic development” scenario, hog production 
clearly displays an inverted U pattern over the entire simulation period.  Hog production 
increases steadily from 158 kg in Period 1 to 240 kg in Period 8 (about 40 percent 
increase from Period 1).  However, when the economy further evolves, hog production 
starts to contract.  In Period 12, the farm household only produces 199 kg (about 10 
percent decrease from Period 8). This magnitude of changes in hog production is largely 
consistent with the observed changes in average hog production across terciles in the 
RCRE households (second row from bottom, Appendix C).  Sensitivity analysis shows 
that that this inverted-U relationship is robust to my assumption of the initial levels of 
grain and labor transaction costs, the growth rate in grain yield and any expansion in 
fixed assets in hog production (Appendix D, Scenarios 1, 2, 4 and 5).  In contrast, if we  
                                                 
19  The RCRE data do not provide direct information on grain and labor transaction costs and how they 
change over time. I assume that grain transaction costs are 30 percent of its market prices at the early stages 
of development (Period 1), because studies of farm household economy in other developing countries 
suggest that grain transaction costs can be as high as one-third of grain market price (Key, Sadoulet, and de 
Janvry, 2000). 
20 With the RCRE data, I use a regression approach to generate estimates of the growth rates of off-farm 
wage rates, grain yields and labor endowment.  I find that rural wage rates and grain yield increase at the 
rates of 5 percent and 2 percent respectively, while the family size decreases by nearly 2 percent each year. 
21 Other capital inputs in hog production include expenses incurred to maintain and upgrade hog raising 
facilities and expenses in veterinary services.  I assume that the capital inputs increases by 10 percent per 
period which is consistent with the observed increases in investment by Chinese farm household during this 
period by de Brawn (2000). In addition, I test the robustness of the results by either including or excluding 
this improvement in fixed assets.   
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assume that grain and labor markets are perfect without any transaction costs, simulation 
results show that hog production continues to decrease over the entire 12 periods, and the 
inverted-U relationship is not present (Appendix D, Scenario 3).  These results indicate 
that grain and labor market development plays a pivotal role in the observed inverted-U 
relationship between hog production and economic development.   
In summary, the simulation exercise creates the following hypotheses that can be 
tested in the econometric model:  
Hypothesis 1:  In the case of poor, grain-deficit, the emergence of grain markets 
has a positive effect on hog production; its effect on richer, grain-surplus 
households is negative; 
 
Hypothesis 2: Labor market development increases the opportunity cost of farm 
labor and has a negative effect on the hog production of both poor and rich 
farmers; and 
  
Hypothesis 3:  Increases in the off-farm wage rate and contractions in farm 
household size would make labor tighter when households are considering 
expanding hog production; however, improved grain production technologies 
would have a positive effect on household hog production. The theoretical model 
shown that these factors affect household hog production and supplement the 
forces of market emergence, contributing to the inverted-U relationship between 
development and hog production. 
 
 
4. Empirical Model  
In this section, I construct an econometric model to directly test these three 
hypotheses.  If I can find evidence that the linkages between market emergence and hog 
production behave in a manner consistent with the three hypotheses, then we have a 
market emergence and maturation based explanation for the inverted U relationship 
between development (or income) and livestock production. To test the hypotheses, I first 
specify our econometric model and construct the variables.  Next, I discuss the estimation 
strategy.  Finally, after presenting the results, I use the coefficients to demonstrate that  
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grain and labor market development can explain a significant portion of rise and fall of 
China’s backyard hog sector over the past two decades.    
4.1. Basic Model and Variable Construction 
The basic econometric model is:  
ijt ijt ijt ijt ij ijt u Z R M Hog ε β β β + + + + = ' ' ' 3 2 1   .    (4) 
In equation (4) the dependent variable, Hogijt, is measured as the quantity of hog output 
in kilograms that is produced by household i in village j during year t.  Three groups of 
factors are assumed to explain hog production, market development (Mjt), risk 
preferences (Rijt) and other determinants (Zijt). 
Our main variable of interest in equation (4), Mjt, measures the extent of market 
development, and it includes two indices, one representing grain market development and 
the other representing labor market development.  To test the effects of labor market 
development on hog production, I use the share of non-agricultural labor in the village 
labor force as an indicator of labor market development.  If β1 is negative and significant, 
then as labor markets develop hog production falls, which is our test of hypothesis 2. 
The grain market development index is included to test hypothesis 1. I utilize two 
approaches in the test.  First, I use a set of variables that are related to grain transactions 
costs, including the distance to a major road, the value of the vehicles that are owned by 
the household and two dummy variables, which hold constant if the village is in a suburb 
of a city and if village is in a remote mountainous region.  The matrix of variables that 
measure the transactions costs associated with grain markets are henceforth referred to as 
grain market indicator 1.  Alternatively, I can use the percentage of the village grain 
output sold in the market, a measure of grain commercialization rates. This variable  
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henceforth is referred to as grain market indicator 2.  In my subsequent analysis, I test for 
the validity of hypothesis 1 by examining if β1 is positive for low-income households and 
negative for high-income households. 
There are advantages and disadvantages associated with both indicators.  Many 
empirical studies use grain market indicator 1 to measure transactions costs and market 
development (Key, Sadoulet, de Janvry, 2000; Goetz, 1992; Wik, Taylor, and Holden, 
2000).  This set of indicators has the virtue of being exogenous in a conceptual sense and 
directly associated with grain transaction costs.  However, these variables may not 
capture all aspects of local market performance or pick up all of the costs associated with 
grain transactions.  In other words, these variables might underestimate grain market 
development. 
On the other hand, grain commercialization rates can proxy for the level of grain 
market development, or grain market indicator 2.  Based on a similar logic in specifying 
the measure of labor market development (the other variable of interest), the literature 
provides evidence suggesting that agricultural commercialization rates are linked to the 
level of market development and may be a good proxy (Ahmed, 1994; Von Braun, 1994).  
The strength of using grain commercialization rates is that, unlike grain market indicator 
1, it may be able to capture a broader set of transactions costs and other factors that make 
up market development.  The weakness of using grain commercialization rates, however, 
lies in the fact that grain commercialization rates can be endogenous.  Specifically, it may 
be that grain commercialization rates are affected by unobserved factors that affect both 
grain sales and hog production.  If so, then the coefficient of the grain commercialization 
rate, β1, could be biased due to endogeneity.  To address this issue, I need to use  
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statistical methods to control for the endogeneity.  Because no one indicator is without 
limitations, in the empirical analysis, I use both indicators to test the effects of grain 
market development on hog production. 
I also include several other variables in the estimation model to test Hypothesis 3 
and help isolate the effects of market development on hog output.  The household wealth 
level is used to capture farm household risk preferences, Rijt, although I recognize that 
wealth also is associated with other, sometimes offsetting, determinants, such as changes 
in liquidity and preferences for cleanliness.  Other economic factors included in Zijt that 
might affect hog production consist of wage rates, farm household size, grain yields, hog 
and grain prices, the farm household education level, and the share of industrial revenue 
in the total village revenue.
22  The first component of the error term, uijt, captures other 
unobserved household and village characteristics that may affect the household’s hog 
production decision-making process.  It is possible that uijt may be correlated with the 
market indicator variables.  The second component of the error terms, εij, is uncorrelated 
shocks to hog production. 
4.2. Estimation Strategies 
4.2.1.Tobit Model 
Because a farm household either produces a positive number of hogs or no hogs, 
the dependent variable, hog output per farm, is truncated at zero.  A tobit model is 
suitable for the empirical estimation and can be specified as:
23   
                                                 
22 The wage rates and grain yield are computed at the village level. Village grain yield is computed as the 
ratio of aggregate village grain output to sown areas in the village.   
23 However, if we believe that the factors determining whether a farm household would raise hogs are 
different from factors affecting the number of hogs to raise, the Heckman Selection Model might be 
preferred. In this study, I cannot find obvious factors that affect one but not the other.  
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εijt is an independently distributed error term and assumed to be normal with zero mean 
and constant variance σ
2.  Thus, the model assumes that there is an underlying stochastic 
index equal to (xijtβ+uijt), which is observed only when it is positive.
24  The marginal 
effects of a change in xijt on yijt (the censored dependent variable) and yijt
* (the 
observations above censoring points) are not equal to βI, instead they are equal to: 
] ) ( / ) ( ) ( / ) ( 1 [ / *] [
2 2 z F z f z F z zf x y E i i ijt − − = ∂ ∂ β          (6) 
i ijt ijt z F x y E β ) ( / ] [ = ∂ ∂                     (7) 
4.2.2. Unobserved Effects 
  To answer how the differences in grain and labor market development, both 
across villages and over time, would contribute to the different levels of hog production, I 
choose to mainly rely on a tobit random effects model.
25  The consistency of the random 
effects model, however, requires that unobservable household and village characteristics 
                                                 
24 Tobin further shows that the expected value of y in the model is  ) ( ) ( z f z F x Ey σ β + = ,where z=xb/s, f(z) 
is the unit normal density, and F(z) is the cumulative normal distribution function. The expected value of y 
for observations above the limit (y*) is: 
) ( / ) (
) | (
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Thus, the relationship between the expected value of all observations, Ey, and the expected value 
conditional upon being above the limit, Ey*, is  * ) ( Ey z F Ey = . 
    
25  Because a fixed effect model is essentially a within-groups estimator, it does not capture the effects 
across households and villages. A fixed effects model depends solely on the deviations of the dependent 
variables and explanatory variables from their respective group (farm household in this study) means, and it 
makes no use of the fact that the group means are in general different for different groups (Davidson and  
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(u
ijt that could also affect hog production) be uncorrelated with other explanatory 
variables in the estimation equation.  This requirement might not hold.  For example, as 
mentioned above, grain commercialization rate, as the indicator for grain market 
development, might be endogenous, thereby causing bias.  
Our main strategy to try to control for the covariance between the residual in 
Equation 4 and the grain market development is to use an instrumental variable approach.  
In the estimation, I assume that grain quotas and transactions costs affect the endogenous 
variable (grain market development) but does not affect the outcome variable, (hog 
production), except through the effects of market development.  The logic of this strategy 
relies on the exogeneity of national grain quota policy.  As long as officials assign quotas 
to villages without consideration of their status as a livestock producer, and if the size of 
the quota in an economy like China could affect the development of the local grain 
market, I should have a valid instrument.  The same logic is used for transactions costs. 
I also used several other approaches to correct fixed effects and minimize the 
possible endogeneity bias.  First, I use Honre’s fixed effect tobit model to demonstrate 
how results might change using a fixed effects model.  While such a model would 
account for all non-time varying fixed effects, according to Deaton (1997), it is possible 
that the presence of measurement error could offset the gains from the reduction of the 
bias that would come from eliminating the fixed effects.  Second, in my empirical 
models, I lag most of the explanatory variables to minimize the contemporary correlation 
between u
ijt and explanatory variables.
26 Finally, I generate many explanatory variables 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mackinnon, 1993). Thus, the differences across different households and villages are entirely ignored in the 
estimation. 
26 The unobserved household effects at one period are generally thought to be uncorrelated to explanatory 
variables in the previous period.  
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from village-level surveys instead of household-level surveys.  For example, grain yields, 
wage rates and grain and hog prices are all based on data from the village-level surveys.  
This has two benefits in controlling the covariance between the error term and 
explanatory variables.  Since the data for the left and right hand side variables come from 
different survey instruments, there is less reason to believe there are correlated errors 
from the data collection process.  In addition, using explanatory variables constructed 
from village level data eliminate the presence of unobserved household effects.  In 
summary, after specifying my variables in this manner, I assume the I have accounted for 
most of the unobserved heterogeneity and so the empirical analysis will rely mainly on 
the random effects tobit model.  Since it is difficult to control for all unobserved 
heterogeneity, however, I supplement the analysis with IV and fixed effects estimators.  
While controlling for potential econometric problems, I proceed with my tests of 
the three hypotheses.  First, I begin my test of Hypothesis 3 by running the regressions 
with a random effects tobit model using the entire sample observations.  I am particularly 
interested in examining the coefficients on the grain yield, family size and wage 
variables.  According to the theory, these variables may reinforce the expansion and 
contraction of hog production as an economy develops from underdeveloped stage to 
more developed stage.  I test the robustness of the results by including different control 
variables and using different grain market indicators.  I also use these coefficients in the 
later decomposition exercise. 
Next, I begin to directly test the market emergence hypotheses.  According to the 
data and theory, market development could have different effects on hog production as 
the economy develops (or as household incomes increase).  Consequently, I divide the  
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sample into three income terciles (or low-, medium-, and high-income subgroups).  Using 
these subsets of data, I conduct separate regression analyses and test different parts of the 
hypothesis.  For example, I use the lower income subgroup to test whether or not 
backyard livestock production rises as grain markets emerges (first part of Hypothesis 1).  
I then use the higher income subgroup to test whether or not grain market development 
(second part of Hypothesis 1) and labor market development (Hypothesis 2) lead to 
falling hog production.  
4.3. Estimation Results 
  Almost all the models analyzing the effects of labor and grain market 
development on household hog production perform well and produce robust results that 
largely confirm our hypotheses. Many coefficients of the control variables are of 
expected sign and statistically significant.  For example, an increase in wealth is 
associated with a decrease in hog production for all income subgroups (Tables 3.4 and 
3.5), indicating that an improvement in wealth may be enhancing household’s tolerance 
of risk. 
The estimation results are also consistent with Hypothesis 3.  I find that family 
size, grain yields, and wage rates all have separately significant effects on hog 
production. The F-test on the joint significance of these variables is also significant.  The 
effects from these factors are also robust whether I use the entire sample (Table 3), use 
different indicators to measure grain market development, or divide the sample into three 
income subgroups (Tables 3.4 and 3.5).  For example, family size has a significant and 
positive effect on hog production; one fewer family member results in a decrease of as 
much as 11 kg in hog output (about 11 percent, row 8, Table 4). Similarly, grain yields  
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are shown to have a positive effect on hog production for all three income subgroups. 
Finally, an increase in wage rates, a proxy for rising opportunity costs for farm household 
labor, has a negative effect on hog production. All of these are consistent with predictions 
from the theoretical model.  In the next subsection, I show how these factors supplement 
the effects of labor and grain market development and contribute to rise and fall in hog 
production. 
Although effects of grain market development is not significant when entire 
sample is used, it is not surprising since the theoretical model predicts different effects in 
different types of households. The estimation results from separate regressions that use 
the income-based sub-sample, however, confirm hypothesis 1. Using grain market 
indicator 1 (or transactions costs to measure grain market development), I find that for 
poor farm households in the low-income subgroup, a decrease in transactions costs would 
have a significant positive effect on hog production.  For each kilometer closer to a paved 
road, the household would increase hog production by 3.06 kg, or 4.4 percent (row 2, 
Table 4). The opposite effects, however, are found for high-income households. One 
kilometer closer to a paved road reduces hog production by 2.24 kg, or 2.5 percent.  
The estimation results using split samples also show that labor market 
development has a consistent negative effect on hog production, which provides support 
for Hypothesis 2. A one-percent increase in village labor employment in nonagricultural 
activities is associated with a decrease of hog production ranging from 0.21 kg to 0.51 kg 
for farm households in different income groups (row 5, Table 4). Given the fact that, for 
some villages, the participation in off-farm labor markets by the village labor force  
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increased by more than 20 percent over the study period, labor market development can 
have a significant effect on hog production. 
The effects of grain market development are robust to the choice of grain market 
indicators (Table 5). Using grain commercialization rates to measure grain market 
development (although without fully control for endogeneity), I find that an increase in 
grain commercialization rate positively affects hog production for households in the low-
income tercile but negatively affects for households in the high-income tercile. These 
results are consistent with my expectation, because for farm households in the low-
income tercile, which are more likely to be constrained in grain and feed supply, an 
improvement in the grain market would improve their access to feed grain and thus 
encourage hog production.  For farm households in the high-income tercile, which are 
more likely to be grain-surplus and at the same times have more off-farm opportunities, 
an improvement in grain market would likely lead to an increase in direct grain sales in 
the market and a reduction in grain fed to hogs.  
The possible endogeneity problem in the estimation of the model does not seem to 
cause a concern (Tables 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8). To address the potential endogeneity problem, 
as discussed above, I use both an instrumental variable approach and a fixed effects 
approach. When using the grain commercialization rate to measure grain market 
development, I use the government grain quota and several variables associated with 
grain transactions costs as the instruments for grain commercialization rate.  I find that 
grain market development continues to display similar effects on hog production for 
households in different income terciles. A higher grain commercialization rate leads to 
expansion of hog production for the low-income households, but its effects on high- 
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income households are negative.  Also, labor market development continues to show a 
negative effect on hog production for households in different income subgroups. 
  Alternatively, I use a fixed effects model to control for endogeneity caused by 
non-time varying fixed effects and find that results are mostly consistent. Because the 
censoring nature of my dependent variable, I use Honre’s fixed effects tobit model 
(Tables 3.7 and 3.8). Grain market development continues to show a positive effect on 
hog production for households in the low-income subgroup and a negative effect for the 
high income subgroup. The effects of labor market development are also negative. 
Although the t-ratios on the labor market variable are relatively low, it is not altogether 
unexpected. This might be due to the significant efficiency loss associated with the fixed 
effects model (Deaton, 1997). It is posited that the presence of measurement error could 
significantly offset the gains from the reduction of the bias that would come from 
eliminating the fixed effects. Taking all the regression results together, I believe that I 
have fairly strong evidence supporting that market development contributes to the 
observed inverted-U relationship between income and hog production.  
4.4.  Market Development and Rise and Fall in Hog Production  
During the past two decades, backyard hog production has decreased significantly 
in rich, inland areas, but in the meantime, we observe a significant expansion in poor, 
inland areas. The following decomposition exercise indicates that labor and grain market 
development can help explain a significant portion of the observed pattern in hog 
production from 1986 to 1996 in China. In this analysis, I chose two sets of provinces: 
Henan and Jiangsu provinces north of the Yangtse river, henceforth North China, and  
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Guizhou and Guangdong provinces in South China.
27  I compare the simulated changes 
(predicted using the coefficients in the results times the observed change in the hog 
production determinants, i.e., the RHS variables in the hog production model in Table 4) 
with the “actual” changes in hog production reported in published sources. Specifically, I 
simulate how a representative farm household in one of these provinces would change its 
hog output from 1986 to 1996 based on the observed changes in various determinants.   
During the sample period from 1986 to 1996, the average Jiangsu farm household 
decreased its hog output by 40 kg (bottom row, Table 9). The expansion of grain and 
labor markets in Jiangsu, for example, led to a fall in hog production of about 10.51 kg, 
accounting for about 25 percent of the decline (sum of rows 1 to 4), while rising wage 
rates and smaller farm household size account for about 17 percent and 4 percent 
respectively (rows 5 and 6).  While the direct effects of labor market development (about 
4 percent) might seem small, the better labor markets enable farm households to access 
off-farm job markets and take advantage of rising off-farm wage rates. Therefore, if we 
include both direct and indirect effects, labor market development can explain more than 
20 percent of decrease in average household hog production from 1986 to 1996.   
For Henan province, however, the simulation results show that more than half (52 
percent, row 11) of the total increase in hog production in Henan province between 1986 
and 1996 (about 31 kilograms per household, row 8) can be explained by the combined 
effects of changes in markets, risk, the opportunity costs of resources, and other factors  
(Table 8). Among these factors, grain market development (rows 1 and 3) can account for 
32 percent of the increase in hog production, but this positive impact is offset by the 
                                                 
27 Henan and Guizhou are two poor, inland provinces experiencing a significant increase in household hog 
production in the past two decades, while Jiangsu and Guangdong are two rich, coastal provinces showing  
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negative effect from labor market development. Similarly, I find that the development of 
grain and labor markets can also explain a significant portion of the rise and fall of 
backyard hog production in Guizhou and Guangdong (Appendix E). 
 
5. Summary of Findings and Future Research 
In this paper, I use backyard hog production in China as a case study to explain 
the linkage between market emergence and patterns of backyard hog production in China. 
The results indicate that rural market development, especially labor and grain market 
development, could have significant, but different effects on household hog production 
for households at the different levels of economic development. While it is true that 
market development might foster contraction in hog production in rich, coastal areas, 
market development might also lead to expansion in hog production in poor inland areas.  
This study has its limitations. As shown in the decomposition analysis, the 
regression equation can only explain about half of the observed rise in hog production in 
poor provinces. This can be due to several reasons. First, the level of grain market 
development might be underestimated when it is only measured by variables associated 
with transactions costs.  Second, over the past two decades, we also observe significant 
improvements in livestock output markets.  In recent years, livestock products produced 
in the inland regions are not only sold in the local markets, but also in the distant markets 
(including markets in the coastal areas). In other words, the livestock output markets are 
more integrated in recent years than the beginning period of the economic reform in the 
1980s.  Unfortunately, this information is not available in the RCRE data.  Finally, 
improvements in hog production technologies, including better hog varieties and more 
                                                                                                                                                 
a decrease in backyard hog production over the study period.  
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effective and available veterinary services, might also contribute to increases in hog 
production in the inland region. Again, this information is not available in the RCRE 
data.  Nevertheless, if we take these additional factors into consideration, it is likely that 
the increased supply from inland region more than compensates for the fall in supply in 
the coastal region. In fact, the competition from supply from inland areas might have 
driven some of the commercialized livestock operations in the coastal areas out of 
business in the late 1990s.  
The results from study could benefit the policy makers in the livestock sector in 
several ways.  First, when making livestock policies, decision makers should pay more 
attention to the backyard livestock sub-sector as well as its relationship with labor and 
grain market conditions. Second, this study provides a foundation on which we can 
project how backyard hog production might evolve in the future. Based on the estimates 
derived in this study, we can assist policy makers to make better use of limited 
government funds and help prevent investment losses.  
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Table 1. Labor and Grain Market Development 
 




 Share of Non-
Agricultural 
Labor in Village 
Labor (%) 
Percentage of 










Low income  average   70  26  24  1.38  2.05 
Medium Income  average   98  32  28  2.32  1.71 
High Income  average   91  40  29  5.96  1.53 
          
Low income  86  63  20  14  0.9  2.15 
Low income  90  70  22  24  1.2  1.9 
Low income  95  71  33  22  1.56  2.08 
Low income  98  76  32  30  3.14  2.24 
          
Medium Income  86  93  30  24  1.43  1.51 
Medium Income  90  109  26  25  1.61  1.78 
Medium Income  95  110  36  21  3.48  1.95 
Medium Income  98  96  32  35  1.69  1.77 
          
High Income  86  76  36  28  3.54  1.33 
High Income  90  114  37  23  4.27  1.49 
High Income  95  73  39  29  5.99  1.57 
High Income  98  84  45  34  4.99  1.64 
 
Source: The Household Survey Data Conducted by Research Center of Rural Economy, 
Ministry of Agriculture, China, 1986-1999  
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Table 2. Effects of Some Economic Factors on Hog Production Under 
Different Market Conditions 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10 11 12
1. Wage Rate: wage rates increase by 2.5 percent per period 
Wage Rates  2.00 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 2.25 2.30 2.35  2.40  2.45 2.50 2.55
Perfect Market  100 90 81 73 66 61 55 51  47  43 40 37
  
Missing Grain Market Only  35 29 24 22 20 18 16 15  14  13 12 11
  
Missing Labor Market Only     
  
Missing Both Labor and Grain Market     
  
2. Grain Yield: grain yield increases by 5% per period 
Grain Production  Shifter    
Perfect Market  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100 100 100
  
Missing Grain Market Only  35 43 52 63 76 90 107 126  147  171 196 223
  
Missing Labor Market Only  291 264 237 212 189 167 147 129  113  98 85 74
  
Missing Both Labor and Grain Market  149 162 175 187 199 212 224 236  247  259 271 283
  
3. Credit: fixed assets used in hog production increases by 50 Yuan per period 
Capital Used in Hog production  100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450  500  550 600 650
Perfect Market  100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450  500  550 600 650
  
Missing Grain Market Only  35 52 68 84 100 115 130 145  160  174 188 202
  
Missing Labor Market Only  291 363 419 466 505 540 571 599  624  648 670 690
  
Missing Both Labor and Grain Market  149 162 171 179 186 192 197 202  206  210 214 217
  
4. Labor Endowment: household labor endowment decreases by 200 labor-hour per period 
Labor Endowment (hours)  3700 3500 3300 3100 2900 2700 2500 2300  2100  1900 1700 1500
Perfect Market  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  100  100 100 100
  
Missing Grain Market Only  35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35  35  35 35 35
  
Missing Labor Market Only  311 302 293 284 275 266 257 248  239  229 220 210
  
Missing Both Labor and Grain Market  223 214 204 194 184 174 163 152  141  130 118 106
  
5. Hog Price: hog price increases by 10 percent per period   
Hog Prices  5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5  9.0  9.5 10.0 10.5
Perfect Market  100 146 207 286 384 506 655 835  1050  1303 1600 1945
  
Missing Grain Market Only  35 50 70 94 122 154 195 248  312  387 476 578
  
Missing Labor Market Only  291 342 387 426 459 487 512 533  552  569 584 598
  
Missing Both Labor and Grain Market  149 149 149 149 149 149 175 205  234  263 291 318
  
6. Grain Price: grain price increases by 2.5 percent per period    
Grain Prices  2.00 2.05 2.10 2.15 2.20 2.25 2.30 2.35  2.40  2.45 2.50 2.55
Perfect Market  100 92 85 78 73 68 63 59  56  52 49 46
  
Missing Grain Market Only     
  
Missing Labor Market Only  291 265 240 216 195 175 157 141  126  113 101 91
  




Table 3.  Estimates From Tobit Model Using Whole Sample Observations, The 
RCRE Data, 1986-1999 
 
      Random Effects Tobit Model 
  Variable Explanations  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Grain Market Development 
Indicator 2  Grain Commercialization Rate   -0.701  -0.675     
      [4.7]***  [4.58]***     
Grain Market Development 
Indicator 1 
Distance to the Major Roads from the 
Village (km)      0.62  0.421 
       [0.65]  [0.44] 
 
Value of Transportation Facilities, (100 
Yuan (1986), lagged one year)      -0.988  -1.018 
       [5.19]***  [5.35]*** 
  City Suburb (1:yes; 0: no)      -31.781  -27.176 
       [2.56]**  [2.18]** 
 
Terrain (1: Plain; 2: Hilly; and 3: 
Mountainous)     19.144  20.236 
       [3.41]***  [3.69]*** 
Labor Market Development 
Indicator 
Share of Non-agricultural Labor force in 
the Village, (lagged one year) -0.023  0.204  0.191  0.267 
   [0.1]  [1.26]  [1.02]  [1.61] 
Risk          
 
Household Wealth Level (100 Yuan 
(1986), lagged one year)  -0.373  -0.366  -0.232  -0.216 
Other Determinants   [7.1]***  [6.93]***  [4.33]***  [4.06]*** 
          
  Village Wage Rates  -4.522 -5.618 -4.195  -5.104 
   [3.5]***  [4.50]***  [3.21]***  [4.05]*** 
  Household Size (lagged one year)  10.557  12.425  11.091  13.251 
   [5.8]***  [6.78]***  [5.90]***  [7.16]*** 
  Village Grain Yield 0.173  0.161  0.172  0.17 
   [8.8]***  [8.19]***  [8.55]***  [8.48]*** 
          
  Village Hog Price (lagged one year)  0.83  0.976  -0.447  -0.453 
   [0.3]  [0.32]  [0.15]  [0.15] 
  Village Grain Price (lagged one year)   -19.693  -18.054 23.985  29.858 
   [1.0]  [0.93]  [1.81]*  [2.28]** 
  Education Level  -0.056    -0.092   
   [0.7]    [1.10]   
 
Share of Industrial Income in the Total 
Village Income  0.291    0.129   
   [1.7]*    [0.76]   
 
Relative Economic Development Status 
Within the County: 1: high; 2: medium-
high; 3: average; 4: medium low: and 5: 
low 8.616    5.536   
   [2.7]***    [1.67]*   
          
Constant   -44.47  -30.711  -115.825  -119.757 
   [2.2]**  [1.73]*  [5.59]***  [5.94]*** 
Number of Observations     6114  6243  6114  6243 
Number of Households     936  944  936  944  
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Table 4. Regression Estimates From Random Effects Tobit Model For Different 
Income Groups Using Grain Market Indicator 1 
    Regression Coefficients     Marginal Effects 
Dependent Variable: 

















1. Market Development                  
 Grain Market 
Development Indicator  
Distance to Major 
Roads from the Village 0.62  -4.781  0.102  4.195    0.39  -3.06  0.16 2.24




Facilities (100 1986 
yuan)  -0.988 -0.163  -0.792 -1.642    -0.54 -0.10  -0.49 -0.82
   [5.2]*** [0.50]  [2.08]**  [4.03]***          
 
City Suburb (1:yes; 
0:no)  -31.781  52.913  1.623 -61.871   -17.94  37.01 1.13 -29.16





3:Mountainous)  19.144 6.185  23.638 56.975    11.49 2.53  14.86 28.80
   [3.4]*** [1.15]  [3.47]*** [6.09]***          
  Labor Market 
Development Indicator 
Share of Non-
Agricultural Labor in 
Village Labor Force 
(lagged one year)  0.191 -0.77 -0.454  -0.778    0.21 -0.51  -0.41 -0.21
  [1.0]  [2.77]*** [1.55]  [2.17]**          
2. Risk 
Household Wealth 
Level (lagged one 
year)  -0.232 -0.127  -0.433 -0.247    -0.14  -0.09  -0.27 -0.14
   [4.3]*** [1.05]  [3.43]*** [3.29]***          
3. Other Determinants                    
  Wage Rates   -4.195  -2.835  -9.428  -6.95    -2.48  -1.51  -5.60 -3.54
   [3.2]*** [1.42]  [4.16]*** [2.84]***          
 
Household Size 
(lagged one year)  11.091 12.955  18.012 16.677    6.29 7.91  11.07 8.43
   [5.9]*** [5.62]*** [6.00]*** [4.25]***          
  Village Grain Yield   0.172  0.164 0.257 0.224    0.09 0.10  0.16 0.10




Within the County: 
(from1-high to 5-low)   5.536 7.179  0.587 18.186    3.13 5.15  1.26 7.55
   [1.7]*  [1.75]*  [0.11]  [2.59]**          
 
Village Grain Price 
(lagged one year)  23.985  21.47  30.431  -0.051    -5.87  -34.34  -2.66 -64.81
   [1.8]*  [1.66]*  [1.26]  [0.00]           
 
Village Hog Price 
(lagged one year)  -0.447 0.62  0.354  3.63   -0.39  0.41  0.24 2.72
  [0.1]  [0.15]  [0.07]  [0.60]           
 
Share of Family Labor 
with more than junior 
high education  -0.092  0.18  0.012  -0.788    -0.06  0.10  0.01 -0.38
  [1.1]  [1.77]*  [0.10]  [4.91]**          
 
Village data: share of 
industrial income in 
total village income  0.129 -0.125 -0.184 1.291    0.06  -0.02  -0.04 0.55
    [0.8]  [0.51]  [0.64]  [3.98]***       
                
Constant    -115.825 -87.963  -114.848  -198.596       
    [5.6]*** [3.40]*** [3.52]*** [4.87]***       
Observations     6114  1942  2071  2101                
Number of households     936  570  688  628                 
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Table 5. Regression Estimates From Random Effects Tobit Model For Different 
Income Groups Using Grain Market Indicator 2 
 


















               
1. Market 
Development               




Rate -0.701  0.265  -0.82  -1.74  -0.39  0.16  -0.51  -0.88 
    [4.7]*** [1.55]  [3.64]*** [5.76]***      
  Labor Market 
Development 
Indicator 
Share of Non-agric. Labor 
in the Village Labor Force 
(lagged one year)  -0.023  -0.734 -0.588 -1.303  -0.01 -0.45  -0.36  -0.66 
    [0.1]  [2.74]**  [1.99]**  [3.58]***      
2. Risk, Credit, 
and Changing 
Preference 
Household Wealth Level 
(lagged one year)  -0.373  -0.134 -0.601 -0.376  -0.21 -0.08  -0.37  -0.19 
    [7.1]*** [1.22]  [5.21]*** [4.78]***      
3. Other 
Determinants               
  Wage  Rates  -4.522  -2.497 -9.67 -8.272  -2.54  -1.53 -5.96 -4.20 
    [3.5]*** [1.26]  [4.30]*** [3.35]***      
                
 
Family Size (lagged one 
year) 10.557 11.929  17.64  12.554  5.93  7.30  10.87  6.37 
    [5.8]*** [5.29]*** [5.91]*** [3.14]***      
                
  Village Grain Yield  0.173  0.133 0.231 0.206  0.10 0.08 0.14 0.10 
    [8.8]*** [5.81]*** [8.64]*** [5.86]***      
                
 
Village Hog Price (lagged 
one year)  0.83 -0.114  0.186  8.304  0.47  -0.07  0.11  4.21 
    [0.3]  [0.03] [0.04] [1.37]         
                
 
Village Grain Price (lagged 
one year)  -19.693 -55.388  -5.705  -97.17  -11.07  -33.89  -3.52  -49.31 
    [1.0]  [2.43]**  [0.18]  [2.25]**       
                
 Education  Level  -0.056  0.117  0.025  -0.781  -0.03  0.07  0.02  -0.40 
    [0.7]  [1.17]  [0.20]  [4.84]***      
 
Share of Village Industrial 
Income in the Total Village 
Income)  0.291 -0.053  -0.08  1.326  0.16  -0.03  -0.05  0.67 
    [1.7]*  [0.23]  [0.28]  [4.05]***      
 
Relative Economic 
Development Level (from 
Low-5 to High-1)  8.616 9.349  2.85  23.804  4.84  5.72  1.76  12.08 
    [2.7]*** [2.35]**  [0.55]  [3.48]***      
                
Constant   -44.47  -45.116  -18.098  14.115       
    [2.2]** [1.83]*  [0.55]  [0.34]       
                
Observations     6114  1942  2071  2101               
Number of Households  936  570  688  628               
  
  40
Table 6. Regression Estimates From Tobit Random Effects Instrumental Variable 
Model Using Grain Market Indicator 2 
 
   Low Income  Medium Income  High Income 
Grain Commercialization Rate (with IV)  0.28  1.371  -1.716 
 [3.01]***  [1.54]  [1.67]* 
Share of Non-agricultural Labor in 
Village Labor Force (lagged one year)  -0.7  -0.565  -0.896 
 [2.55]**  [1.88]*  [1.58] 
Household Wealth Level (lagged one 
year) -0.072  -0.531  -0.318 
 [0.64]  [4.26]***  [3.10]*** 
      
Village Wage Rate  -0.626  -9.279  -18.044 
 [0.32]  [3.96]***  [4.55]*** 
      
Household Size (lagged one year)  12.318  17.193  9.422 
 [5.25]***  [5.63]***  [1.59] 
      
Village Unit Grain Yield  0.153  0.242  0.173 
 [6.28]***  [9.03]***  [3.05]*** 
Village Hog Price (lagged one year)  -5.294  -5.268  26.577 
 [1.45]  [1.27]  [2.81]*** 
Village Grain Price (lagged one year)  -50.271  -7.252  -160.982 
 [2.16]**  [0.23]  [2.63]** 
      
Education Level  0.167  -0.017  -1.017 
 [1.64]*  [0.13]  [4.44]** 
Share of Industrial Income in Total 
Village Income  -0.15 -0.011  1.755 
 [0.66]  [0.04]  [3.74]*** 
Relative Economic Development Level 
(from Low-5 to High-1)  7.835 5.365  16.328 
 [1.95]*  [1.03]  [1.54] 
      
Constant -59.813  -151.308  64.587 
 [2.24]**  [1.89]*  [0.94] 
      
Observations 1935  2059  1035 
Number of Households  569  679  423  
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Table 7. Estimates From Using Honre’s Fixed Effects Tobit Model and Grain 
Market Development Indicator 1 
 
      Low Income  Medium Income  High Income 
Dependent Variable: 
Pork Output  Variable Descriptions      
1. Market 
Development        
 Grain Market 
Development   
Indicator 2 
Grain Commercialization 
Rate (lagged one year)       
       
 Grain Market 
Development Indicator 
1 
Distance to the Major 
Roads from the Village  -3.31 0.75  0.15 
   [2.37]** [0.51]  [0.05] 
 
Value of Transportation 
Facilities (100 1986 yuan, 
lagged one year)  0.44 -1.84  -3.28 
   [1.04] [4.41]***  [2.37]** 
  City suburb (1:yes; 0:no)  63.10 55.14  -6.11 
   [1.55] [2.38]**  [0.13] 
 
Terrain Condition (1:plain; 
2: Hilly; and 
3:mountainous)  -21.58 54.51  176.50 
   [2.04]** [2.66]**  [1.32] 
  Labor Market 
Development Indicator  Share of Non-agricultural   -0.31 -0.12  -0.54 
   [1.31] [0.46]  [1.08] 
       
2. Risk 
Household Wealth Level 
(lagged one year)  0.08 -0.42  -0.16 
   [0.26] [2.01]**  [2.16]** 
3. Other Determinants Wage Rates  5.46 -1.90  -2.38 
   [1.73] [0.45]  [0.53] 
       
 
Household Size (lagged one 
year)  1.64 6.50  -7.40 
   [0.55] [1.20]  [0.67] 
       
  Village Grain Yield  0.06 0.10  -0.37 
   [1.07] [1.60]  [2.94]** 
 
Village Hog Price (lagged 
one year)  -3.50 -3.99  16.95 
   [0.69] [0.94]  [1.32] 
 
Village Grain Price (lagged 
one year)  -62.98 72.21  -48.63 
   [2.04]** [1.74]*  [0.57] 
 Education  Level  -0.05 0.06  -0.91 
   [0.30] [0.23]  [2.47] 
 
Share of Industrial Income 
in the Total Village Income 0.10 0.77  2.22 
   [0.55] [1.73]*  [2.45] 
 
Relative Economic 
Development Status Within 
the County (from low-1 to 
high-5)  -5.75 -7.87  -9.30 
   [0.83] [0.80]  [0.63] 
       
       
Observations     1942  2071  2101  
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Table 8. Estimates From Using Honre’s Fixed Effects Tobit Model and Grain 
Market Development Indicator 2 
 
    Low Income  Medium Income  High Income 
Dependent Variable: 
Pork Output  Variable Descriptions          
1. Market 
Development            
 Grain Market 
Development   
Indicator 2 
Grain Commercialization 
Rate (lagged one year)  0.80 -0.13 -0.88 
   [4.80]*** [0.38]  [1.73]* 
  Labor Market 
Development Indicator 
Share of Non-agricultural 
Labor   -0.33 -0.08 -0.36 
   [1.42] [0.29] [0.72] 
2. Risk 
Household Wealth Level 
(lagged one year)  0.27 -0.66 -0.18 
   [0.96] [2.13]**  [2.12]** 
3. Other 
Determinants  Wage Rates  6.44 -1.92 0.41 
   [2.08]** [0.45]  [0.10] 
 
Household Size (lagged 
one year)  0.98 6.44 -8.32 
   [0.32] [1.10] [0.65] 
  Village Grain Yield  0.02 0.11 -0.36 
   [0.32] [1.72]*  [2.57]** 
 
Village Hog Price 
(lagged one year)  -5.45 -4.41 18.79 
   [1.08] [0.98] [1.45] 
 
Village Grain Price 
(lagged one year)  -33.68 50.65 -38.06 
   [1.35] [1.30] [0.43] 
 Education  Level  -0.09 0.05 -0.93 
   [0.52] [0.21]  [2.45]** 
 
Share of Industrial 
Income in the Total 
Village Income  -0.21 0.85 2.49 




Within the County (from 
low-1 to high-5)  -3.77 -0.90 -1.88 
   [0.56] [0.09] [0.13] 
Observations     1942  2071  2101  
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Table 9. Changes in Per Farm Household Hog Production in Hennan and Jiangsu 
Provinces, China (1986 vs. 1996) 
 
         Henan       Jiangsu 















































1986 Yuan)  -0.1 0.8 -0.08 0% -0.82 2  -1.64 4% 
              
  City Surburb?  37.01  0.1  3.70  12%  -29.16  0.1  -2.92  7% 
               
Labor 
Market 





b -0.51  12.00  -6.12  -20%  -0.21  7.00  -1.47  4% 
              
Wage Rate
c    -1.51  -0.60 0.90  3%  -3.54  1.90 -6.74  17% 




d    7.91 -0.66  -5.22  -17%  8.43 -0.20  -1.68  4% 




e   0.1 116.47 11.65  38%  0.1  66.20  6.62  -17% 
              
              
Other 
Economic 
Factors       5.28 17%     -22.11 55% 




factors           12.60  52%          -29.87  86% 
              
Residuals       18.30  48%      -10.13  14% 




(1996-1986)           30.90  100%          -40.00  100% 
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a  The  distance to major road decreases by 2km (based on the RCRE data), and transportation assets 
increase by 80 Yuan in Guizhou and Henan and by 200 Yuan in Jiangsu and Guangdong (based on the 
summary information on the RCRE) in all provinces over the study period I also assume a change of 0.1 in 
the dummy variable, whether the village is city suburb or not, to account for the fairly rapid urbanization 
movement occurred in the study period.  
b The level of labor market development is measured by the percentage of farm labor working in 
nonagricultural sector. The data are from China Statistical Yearbook, 1987 and 1997. 
c Wage rates are based on wage rates in agricultural sectors reported in China Statistical Yearbook, 1987 
and 1997.  Wage rates for Inland region is adjusted downward to reflected the fact that the real wage rates 
in the inland provinces decrease during the study period (Xiao-Yuan Dong, Linxiu Zhang, and Amelia 
Hughart, 2002). 
d Data for family size  are computed as the ratio of provincial population to the number of households from 
China Statisitical Yearbook, 1987 and 1997. 
e  Grain productivity is computed as the ratio of provincial total grain output to the total sown area, China 
Statisitical Yearbook, 1987 and 1997. 
f The farm household wealth level are from the RCRE’s National Rural Social-Economic Survey Data 
Collection (or RCRE Survey), where it reports the summary information for different income groups from 
1986-1999.  
g The education level is based on the RCRE’s National Rural Social-Economic Survey Data Collection (or 
the RCRE Survey) 
h I assume that the relative economic development status in the nation for poor provinces is getting worse 
(the relative economic development status index increases by 1), and for rich provinces is getter better(the 
relative economic development status index decreases by 1.  This assumption is based on the fact that there 
are growing economic inequalities across regions in China over the past two decades.  
i Data for per farm household hog output in 1986 are from China Statistical Yearbook, 1987.  And the same 
data for 1997 are from Agricultural Census conducted in 1996, and are computed as the ratio of the total 
hog output produced by farm households to the number of agricultural households.  The hog output (in 













Note: Per capita Income is measure in 1986 Yuan, and the predicted values of hog output 
from the Lowess estimator (with bandwidth of 0.5) are displayed. 
 
Figure 1: Relationship Between Farm Household Hog Output and Household Per 
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Note: The predicted values of hog output from a lowess estimator (with bandwidth of 
0.5) are displayed. 
 
Source: The RCRE Data, 1986-1999 
 
Figure 2: The Relationship Between Grain and Labor Market Development and 
Household Hog Production 
Panel A: Grain Market Development and Household Hog Production
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Figure 3: Effects of Market Development on the Farm Household Hog Production
Panel A: Effects of Grain Market Development



























































Source: Based on the simulation model (see the text for details) 
 
Figure 4. One Illustration of Evolution in Backyard Hog Production as the Economy 
Develops 
123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2
1. Hog Ouput (kg) 158 169 179 189 199 210 220 231 241 238 216 199
2. Grain Transaction 
Cost (Yuan/kg) 0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25 0.2 0.15 0.1 0.05
3. Labor Transaction 




1.33 1.36 1.39 1.41 1.44 1.47 1.5 1.53 1.56 1.59 1.63 1.66
5.Wage Rate 
(Yuan/Labor_hour) 2 2.05 2.1 2.15 2.2 2.25 2.3 2.35 2.4 2.45 2.5 2.55
6.Fixed input in hog 
production (Yuan) 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 200 210 220
7.Total family labor 
endowment (labor_hour) 3200 3136 3072 3008 2944 2880 2816 2752 2688 2624 2560 2496
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Appendix A. Relationship Between Backyard Livestock Production and Household 
Income 
 
Data Source: The Mexico data contains 309 households surveyed in 8 different villages in Mexico during 
1993-1996, while the KwaZulu data contains 463 household observations surveyed in 1998. Data on hog 
output from small producers in Taiwan are based on Taiwan’s Agricultural Yearbook published by the 
Department of Agriculture and Forestry, Taiwan. 
 
Note: For Mexico and KwaZulu, only predicted livestock earnings are shown in the figure; the predicted 
livstock earnings are estimated using the Lowess estimator. 
Panel A: Mexico
Panel B: KwaZulu, South Africa
































































































































Appendix B. Parameters for Household CGE Models 
Production Parameters     
  Labor Fixed  Assets Feed 
Staple 0.41  0.59   
Hog 0.45  0.2  0.35 
      






Staple 0.4  0   
Market 0.15  20   
Leisure 0.45  3200   
      
Baseline Market 
Prices      
Labor  2      
Capital 1     
grain/feed 2     
Hog 5     
market good  1     
Note:  
1)  Both production technology and consumption demand functions are based on the 
standard Cobb-Douglas function.  
2)  The coefficients of grain and hog production function are approximated using the 
RCRE data. The coefficients for consumption function are taken from literature, 
including de Janvry, Fafchamps and Sadoulet (1991). 
3)  I assume that the farm household has a total of 3,200 labor-hour per year 
available.  The farm household has two adult labor, and each has effective1,200 
labor-hours per year.  The other family members contribute 800 labor-hours. 
4)  Prices are largely based on the RCRE data set.   
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Appendix C. Summary Statistics of Major Variables, The RCRE Data, 1986-1999 
      The Mean Values of Regressors 
  








          
Market Development        
  City  Suburb?  0.053 0.017 0.049 0.092 
 
Distances to the Major Roads 
from the Village (km)  1.862 1.810 1.982 1.794 
 
Terrain (1: Plain; 2: Hilly; and 3: 
Mountainous)  1.76 2.06 1.71 1.52 
 
The Value of Transportation 
Facilities, 100 Yuan(1986)  3.3  1.4  2.3  6.0 
 
The Percentage of Village Grain 
Output sold in the Market   27.78  25.95  28.28  29.04 
 
The Share of Non-agricultural 
Laborers in the Village Labor 
Force  32.15 25.32 31.10 39.79 
        
Wealth and Changing 
Preference 
Wealth level of household in 100 
Yuan (1986)  55.78 32.04 47.82 86.65 
        
Other Determinants        
  Village Wage Rates  4.679  3.967  4.530  5.516 
 
The Number of Prime Age 
Laborers  2.580 2.614 2.617 2.510 
  The Number of Dependents  1.893 2.203 1.939 1.547 
 
Total Migrant Remittances in the 
Previous Year, 100 Yuan (1986) 3.40  1.73  2.96  5.44 
 
Grain Yield: Village Grain 
Output/ Village Sown Area  381.2  339.0  399.4  404.0 
        
Control Variables        
 
Village Hog Price in the Previous 
Year  2.907 2.880 2.868 2.973 
 
Village Grain Price in the 
Previous Year  0.442 0.446 0.429 0.450 
 
Share of Household Laborers 
with higher than junior high 
education  37.72 33.21 35.43 44.36 
  Sown Area   8.676  8.141  8.818  9.052 
 
The share of Migrant Workers in 
the Village Labor Force   11.86  10.59  12.58  12.36 
 
Economic Development Status 
Within the County: 1: high; 2: 
medium-high; 3: average;4: 
medium low:; and 5: low  2.36  2.55  2.31  2.22 
        
 
Share of Industrial Revenue in 
the total village revenue  17.2 12.1 16.6 22.8 
        
Average Hog Output    87.7  70.3  96  87.8 
Percentage of farm 
households Raising 
Hogs     59.2  65.0  58.5  54.0  
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Appendix D. Sensitivity Analysis of the Inverted-U Relationship Between Hog 
Production and the Economic Development 
 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  9  10  11  12
Scenario 1: similar to baseline case, but lower grain transactions costs, and lower, 5% grain yield growth rate       
Grain  Transactions  costs  0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25  0.20 0.15  0.10 0.05
Labor  transactions  costs  1.60 1.50 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.90  0.80 0.70  0.60 0.50
Grain productivity grow at 5%  1.37  1.44  1.51  1.59  1.67  1.75  1.84  1.93  2.02  2.13  2.23 2.34
Hog  Output  163 179 195 211 227 243 260 253  221 191  163 139
                 
Scenario 2: Similar to the baseline case, but lower labor transactions costs, and lower, 5% grain yield growth rate       
Grain  Transactions  costs  1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1  1 0.9  0.8 0.7  0.6  0.5
Labor  transactions  costs  0.6 0.55 0.5 0.45 0.4 0.35 0.3 0.25  0.2 0.15  0.1  0.05
Grain yield grow at 5%  1.37  1.44  1.51  1.59  1.67  1.75  1.84  1.93  2.02  2.13  2.23 2.34
Hog  output  163 169 172 177 182 188 196 204  214 224  235 220
                 
Scenario 3: Similar to the baseline case, but without any grain and labor transactions costs, and lower, 5% grain yield growth rate 
Grain  Transactions  costs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0  0 
Labor  transactions  costs  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  0 0  0  0 
Grain  yield  grows  at  5%  1.37 1.44 1.51 1.59 1.67 1.75 1.84 1.93  2.02 2.13  2.23 2.34
Hog  output  100  95 90 85 81 77 74 71  68 64  62  59
                 
Scenario 4: same as Scenario 1, but without increases in fixed assets in hog production.                  
Grain  Transactions  costs  0.60 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.40 0.35 0.30 0.25  0.20 0.15  0.10 0.05
Labor  transactions  costs  1.60 1.50 1.40 1.30 1.20 1.10 1.00 0.90  0.80 0.70  0.60 0.50
Grain  yield  grows  at  5%  1.37 1.44 1.51 1.59 1.67 1.75 1.84 1.93  2.02 2.13  2.23 2.34
Hog  output  160 172 185 197 209 221 201 166  136 110  88  70
                
Scenario 5: similar to Scenario 1, but with a very low, 2% growth rate of grain yield                    
grain yield grows at 2%  1.33  1.36  1.39  1.41  1.44  1.47  1.5 1.53  1.56  1.59  1.63 1.66
Hog  output  158 169 179 189 199 210 220 231  241 238  216 199
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Appendix E. Changes in Per Farm Household Hog Production in Guizhou 
and Guangdong Provinces, China (1986 vs 1996) 
 
         Guizhou       Guangdong 





































          
 








1986 yuan) -0.1  0.8  -0.08  0%  -0.82  2  -1.64  5% 
              
  City Suburb  37.01  0.1 3.70 9%  -29.16  0.1 -2.92  9% 
Labor 
Market 





b -0.51  5.00  -2.55  -6%  -0.21  19.00  -3.99  12% 
              
Wage Rates
c  -1.51  -0.53  0.81  2%  -3.54  4.20  -14.88  46% 




d    7.91  -0.68 -5.38 -13% 8.43  -0.32 -2.72  8% 




e   0.1 75.53 7.55  18%  0.1  114.91  11.49  -36% 
              
Other 
Economic 
Factors              




factors           11.93  37%          -36.69  128% 
              





(1996-1986)           41.50  100%          -32.30  100%  
  54
Reference List 
Adams R. H. and J. J. He. Source of Income Inequality and Poverty in Rural Pakistan, 
Research Report 102, International Food Policy Research Institute, 1995. 
 
Ahmed, R. “Investment in Rural Infrastructure: Critical for Commercialization in 
Bangladesh” in Agricultural Commercialization, Economic Development, and Nutrition, 
edited by von Braun, J. and Kennedy J. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994: 141-
152.  
 
Ahmed, R. and Hossain. Development Impact of Rural Infrastructure in Bangladesh, 
Research Report, No. 83, Washington D.C. International Food Policy Research Institute, 
1990. 
 
Arndt, C, R. Schiller, and F. Tarp. “Grain Transport and Rural Credit in Mozambique: 
Solving the Space-time problem.” Agricultural Economics 25(June 2001): 59-70. 
 
Arrow, K, J. Aspects of the Theory of Risk Bearing. Helsinki, Finland: Johnsonin Saatie, 
1965. 
 
Barnum H. N. and L. Squire. “An Econometric Application of the Theory of the Farm 
Household”. Journal of Development Economics 6(March, 1979): 79-102. 
 
Benjamin, D. “Household Composition, Labor Markets, and Labor Demand: Testing for 
Separation in Agricultural Household Models”, Econometrica 60 (March 1992): 287-322. 
 
Benjamin, D., Brandt, L., and S. Rozelle, “Aging, Wellbeing, and Social Security inRural 
Northern China.” Population and Development Review 26(supplement 2000):89-116.  
 
Carter, M.R. “Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Decollectivization of Agriculture”. 
Oxford Economic Papers 39(September 1987): 577-595. 
 
Chen, H., and S. Rozelle. “Leaders, Managers, and the Organization of Township and 
Village Enterprises in China”.  Journal of Development Economics. 60(December 1999): 
529-557. 
 
China Statistical Yearbook, State Statistical Bureau, various issues, 1985-1998. 
 
Davidson R., and J.G. MacKinnon. Estimation and Inference in Economics. Oxford 
University Press, 1993. 
 
De Janvry, A. D., M, Fafchamps, and E. Sadoulet. “Peasant Household Behavior with 
Missing Markets: Some Paradoxes Explained”. The Economic Journal 101(November 
1991): 1400-1417.  
  
  55
Deaton, A. The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconometric Approach to 
Development Policy. Johns Hopkins University Press,1997. 
 
De Brawn, A. "Three Essays on Migration, Education, and Development in Rural China”. 
Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California, Davis, 2001. 
 
Fafchamps M., C. Udry, and K. Czukas. “Drought and Saving in West Africa: Are 
livestock a Buffer Stock?”  Journal of Development Economics, 55(April 1998): 273-
305. 
 
Fan, Jianqing, “Design-adaptive Nonparametric Regression”, Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, Volume 87, Issue 420 (Dec 1992), 998-1004 
 
Fang, C., and F. Fuller, “Feed-Grain Consumption by Traditional Pork-Producing 
Households in China,” Paper presented at WCC-101 Workshop “China’s Role in World 
Food Markets”. Feb. 8-9, 1999.  
 
FAO, Subtainable Animal Production from Small Farm System in South-East Asia, FAO 
Animal Production and Health Paper 106, 1999. 
 
Feder, G., Lau, L. J., Lin, J.Y., S. Luo (1993). “The Nascent Rural Credit Market in 
China”, in K.Hoff, A. Braveman, and J.E.Stiglitz(eds.), The Economics of Rural 
Organization: Theory, Practice and Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Ferris, M.C., and T.S., Munson. “Complementarity Problem in GAMS and The Path 
Solver.” Journal of Economics-Dynamics and Control. 24 (February 2000):168-188. 
 
Ferris, M.C., and T.S., Munson. “Complementarity Problems in GAMS and PATH 
Solver”. Mathematical Programming Technical Report, (September 1998): 98-112. 
 
Fuller, D. Hayes, and D. Smith, “Reconciling Chinese Meat Production and Consumption 
Data,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 49(October 2000): 23-43.  
 
GAMS/PATH user Guide, Version 4.3. http://www.gams.com. 
 
Giles, J. “ Market, Policy, or Nature? Source of Shock to Income in Rural China”, Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1999. 
 
Giles, J. “Is Life More Risky in the Open? Household Risk-Copying and the Opening of 
China’s Labor Markets.” Working Paper, Michigan State University, April 14, 2000. 
 
Goetz, S.J.,”A Selectivity Model of Household Food Marketing Behavior in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 74(May 1992): 444-452. 
 
Goetz, S., Crawford, E., Diagana, B., Holtzman, J. and Weber, M. “An Analysis of the 
effects of Changes in Marketing Institutions and Policy on Cereals Producers and  
  56
Marketing Agents in Southeastern Senegal”, working paper, Michigan State University, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, September, 1999. 
 
Holden,S.T., E.J.Taylor, and S.H. Hampton. “Structural Adjustment and Market 
Imperfections: A Styplized Village Economy-Wide Model with Non-separable Farm 
Households”. Environment and Development Economics, 4(February 1999):69:87. 
 
Honore B. E. “Trimmed Lad and Least Squares Estimation of Truncated and Censored 
Regression Models with Fixed Effects”. Econometrica, Volume 60, Issue 3 (May, 1992): 
533-565. 
 
Honore, B.E, and E. Kyriazidou.”Estimation of Tobit-Type Model with Individual 
Specific Effects.” Econometric Reviews, 19 (2000): 341-366. 
 
Jalan, J, and M. Ravallion. “Are the Poor Less Well-Insured? Evidence on Vulnerability 
to Income Risk in Rural China.” The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 1863, 
December 1997. 
 
Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry. “Transaction Costs and Agricultural Household Supply 
Response.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(May 2000): 245-259. 
 
Komen, M.H.C, J.H.M.Peerlings. “Endogenous technology switches in Dutch Dairy 
farming Under Enviromental Restrictions”. European Review of Agricultural Economics, 
28(2001): 117-142. 
 
Korean Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Resource. Korean Agricultural 
Yearbook. Various issues from 1995-1999. 
 
Kurosaki, T. Risk and Household Behavior in Pakistan’s Agriculture. Occasional Papers 
Series, No. 34. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economics, 1998, pages 165.  
 
Kyriazidou, Ekaterini, “Estimation of a Panel Data Sample Selection Model”, 
Econometrica, Vol. 65, No. 6 (November, 1997), 1335-1364. 
 
Li, S.Y., M. Miyamoto, and K. Kobayashi, “An Economic Analysis of Animal 
Husbandry in a Large Urban Area of Tokyo-A Case Study From Funabashi.” Technical-
Bulletin, Faculty of Horticulture, Chiba University. 1987, No. 39, 77-91 (In Japanese, 
Abstract in English) 
 
Lohmar, B. “Off-farm Labor Market Efficiency in China”, Ph.D. dissertation, University 
of California, Davis, 1999. 
 
McDonald, J.F., and R.A., Moffitt, “The Uses of Tobit Analysis”, The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 62(2)(May 1980): 318-321. 
  
  57
Morduch, J. “Income Smoothing and Consumption Smoothing”. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 9(3)(Summer, 1995):103-114. 
 
Nyberg, A. and S., Rozelle. Accelerating China’s Rural Transformation, The World 
Bank, Washington, D.C., 1999.  
 
Pan, Yaoguo. “New Features in China’s Livestock Industry and the Focuses of Future 
Development.”  Strategic Development of China’s Livestock Industry in the 21
st Century, 
Compiled by Chinese Forestry, Livestock, and Fishery Economics Association, June, 
2000, Beijing, China (in Chinese). 
 
Parish, W., X. Zhe, and F. Li. “Nonfarm Work and Marketization of Chinese 
Countryside”. China-Quarterly, (September 1995): 697-730. 
 
Park, A., H. Jin, S. Rozelle, and J. Huang. “Market Emergence and Transition: Transition 
Costs, Arbitrage, and Autarky in China’s Grain Market.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 84(1)(February 2002): 1133-39. 
 
Park, A.L. Brandt, and J. Giles. “ Competition Under Credit Rationing: Theory and 
Evidence from Rural China.” Working Paper, University of Toronto, November, 1999. 
 
Park A. and C. Ren. “Micro-finance with Chinese Characteristics.” World Development, 
29 (January 2001): 39-62.  
 
Paxson, C.H. “Using Weather Variability to Estimate the Response of Savings to 
Transitory Income in Tailand.” American Economic Review, 82 (March 1992): 15-33. 
 
Research Center for Rural Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, China. National Rural 
Social-Economic Survey Data Collection, China’s Agricultural Press, 2001. 
 
Rosenzweig, M.R. and Wolpin K.I. “Credit Market Constraints, Consumption 
Smoothing, and the Accumulation of Durable Production Assets in Low-Income 
Countries: Investments in Bullocks in India.” Journal of Political Economy, 101 (April 
1993): 223-244.  
 
Rozelle, S., Taylor, J.E., and A. DeBrauw. “Migration, Remittances, and Agricultural 
Productivity in China.” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 82(May 
1999): 287-291.  
 
Rutherford, T.F. “Extension of GAMS for Complementarity Problems Arising in Applied 
Economic Analysis.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 19(1995):1299-1324. 
 
Sadoulet E., de Janvry, A., and C. Benjamin. “Household Behavior with Imperfect Labor 
Markets, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics. Working Paper 786. November 1996, pages 24. 
  
  58
Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss. “ A Survey of Agricultural Household Models: Recent 
Findings and Policy Implications.” World Bank Economic Review 1 (September 1986): 
149-79.  
 
Skoufias, E. “Using Shadow Wages to Estimate Labor Supply of Agricultural 
Households.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 76 (May 1994): 215-227. 
 
Taniguchi, N. “The Conditions of Japanese Agricultural Production.” In Agriculture and 
Agricultural Policy in Japan, edited by The Committee for the Japanese Agriculture 
Session, XXI IAAE Conference. 
 
Taylor, J.E. and Yunez-Naude A., “The Returns from Schooling in a Diversified Rural 
Economy”, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 82(May 2000): 287-297. 
Townsend, R. “Risk and Insurance in Village India.” Econometrica 62(May 1994): 539-
91. 
 
Von-Braun, J. and E. Kennedy. Agricultural Commercialization, Economic Development, 
and Nutrition, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the 
International Food Policy Research Institute, 1994.  
 
Von Braun, J., Kennedy, E, and H, Bouis. Comparative Analyses of the Effects of 
Increased Commercialization of Subsistence Agriculture on Production, Consumption, 
and Nutrition. Washington D.C. International Food Policy Research Institute, September, 
1989. 
 
Wailes, E., C. Fang, X., Zhang, L., Cao, H., Chen, Z. Wu, and J. Guo. “China’s Livestock 
Feed Relationships: Preliminary Results from a Survey in Seven Provinces.” Proceedings 
of WCC-101, January 12-13, 1998, Honolulu, Hawaii.   
 
Wik,M, B.Shiferaw, and S.Holden, 2000. “Poverty, Market Imperfections, and Time 
Preference.” Environment and Development Economics 3(February 1998): 105-130. 
 
Wooldridge, J.M. “Selection Corrections for Panel Data Models Under Conditional Mean 
Independence Assumptions.” Journal of Econometrics 68 (July 1995): 115-132. 
 
Zhang, X. “The Current Situation and Benefit/Cost Analysis of Rural Household Hog 
Production In China” in Research Report of China’s Rural Economy: 1990-1998. Edited 
by Research Center of Rural Economy, Ministry of Agriculture, China. Published by 
China’s Finance and Economics Publishing House, March 1999 (in Chinese). 